Conclusions
Table of Contents

Title Page
Abstract
Acknowledgments
Editorial notes for electronic version
Introduction
1 The Lake Ontario And River St. Lawrence Line (1838-1840)
2 The Sub-contract Model (1841-1849)
3 The Cartel Model (1850-1855)
4 Competition and the Crash (1856-1861)
5 The Canadian Navigation Company (1861-1875)
Conclusions
Introduction
1. Functional and Technological Specialization
2. Business Cycles and Risk
3. Personal Motivation and the Trade
4. Management and the limits to growth
5. The Royal Mail Line and Government
6. The Royal Mail Line and the Grand Trunk Railway
7. Summary
Notes
Table of Illustrations

3. Personal Motivation and the Trade

Given the persistence of limited liability and the failure of some of the major figures in the trade, one may legitimately speculate as to individual proprietor's motivations for entering and remaining in the trade.

Part of the answer emerges from the backgrounds of the principal participants. Most of the proprietors either followed in the footsteps of their fathers, like the Allans and Gildersleeves, or their older brothers, like Hamilton and Bethune, or else, like Captains Dick, Elmsley, Bowen and Sutherland, had gone to sea themselves. fore someone like Milloy buying a passenger steamboat was a natural extension of his career as an agent, a relationship with which the two forwarding partnerships could have sympathized. The single exception to this appears to be Andrew Heron and even his father had leased a ferry on the Niagara River.(4) Consequently, these men were not, as many of the smaller investors were, complete novices to the trade, being able to call upon a wealth of personal experience and family support. Their backgrounds gave them an advantage in the cut and thrust of shipping "politics".

If the steamboat trades could break a man they could also make his fortune. Profits in the trade could be substantial: Sutherland estimated the Magnet's profits for 1851, not an exceptional year, at around 25%.(5) The men who were attracted to the passenger steamboat trade for the most part were ambitious, prepared to gamble on the vagaries of trade and the whims of the lake. At the same time they readily hedged their bets by investing in insurance companies and colluding to avoid "unnecessary" competition. They represented a highly specialized branch of merchant capitalism dealing in a trade with an elongated capital cycle and the requirement of some fairly specific technical skills. In fact, with the exceptions of Heron and Bethune (who on returning to Canada resumed the practice of law), the proprietors were all closely associated with the steamboat trades until their deaths.

Some additional compensation may have seen in the high social profile of the business. In the pre-railway era there was an aura of romance and danger surrounding the trade. The principals were regularly featured in regional newspapers, a factor not unrelated to the volume of their advertising. Bethune attempted unsuccessfully to re-establish his political fortunes on this image.(6) Hamilton, an essentially retiring man, became and remained a political figure for over fifty years on the basis of the trade and his relationship with the Commercial Bank. Hugh Allan got his knighthood because of his transatlantic shipping concerns.(7) Although the freight captains remained practically anonymous, those in the Royal Mail lines were public figures.

After the introduction of the railroad some of the romance and the expectation of high rates of return diminished. However, for those men backing Allan the primary criterion for investing in the trade remained a continuous reasonable rate of return. Their commitment continued to grow because the Canadian Navigation Company provided just such a return.

 


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Chapter 5 appeared in FreshWater.